中国城市住宅小区业主规则依循行为及其对治理机制的影响

The current social management departments are facing a residential area of management difficulties, which led to our concern about the paradox of collective action. That is, because of the participants’ Rules-following behavior, the collective action may be likely move towards the opposite direction expected by the classical theory framework. Related theory suggests that individuals follow the specific self-setting behavioral norms to guide their action, which is called genuine rule-following behavior. The empirical research result show that the genuine rule-following behavior exists generally and universally, and has a fundamental impact intends to study the genuine rule-following behavior on the individual level, defining the genuine rule-following as subjective constraints; Draw on social preferences research paradigm, measure the owners’ genuine rule-following behavior in residential community governance during the rapid transition period of Chinese cities for nearly 30 years, and empirical studies its impact on the performance of residential community governance. On this basis, we provide the policy recommendations on the residential area which is the new focus of social management. The key issues to be resolved in this topic is how to include subjective evaluation (on behavioral norms) in “scene conditions-state” framework to find coordination game strategy equilibrium. Theoretical innovation is to develop a rational choice framework to enhance the explanatory power of the interactive model of belief-preferences and constraint（BPC model）, and also to provide new visual threshold to observe the development of Chinese society.

中国城市住宅小区治理中，居民通过集体行动成功地对政府施加压力的事件表明，在经典理论框架中研究集体行动，可能会出现悖论。相关理论表明，无论是参与者单独行动还是共同行动，一定程度上都是受其自我设定的“规则”引导的规则依循行为。经验研究显示这种规则依循行为在制度选择层面上普遍存在，而且对制度变迁产生根本性影响。针对中国社会转型的现实，本项目拟从个人层面研究规则依循行为，将个人的规则依循界定为主观约束，借鉴社会偏好研究范式，考察和测量住宅小区业主的规则依循行为，并实证其对小区治理绩效的影响。以此为基础将住宅小区作为社会管理的新焦点，提出相关政策建议。拟解决的关键问题是如何在“场景条件-状态”框架中引入协调博弈策略均衡。理论创新是拓展理性选择模型，增强信念-偏好与规则互动模型（BPC模型）的解释力，同时为观察中国社会发展提供新视阈。

本项目针对城市住宅小区业主参与业主自治组织（提供资源）和使用公共收益（提取资源）存在的不同群体偏好，基于资源支配者行为模型（价值观V、资源支配方式S、信念B、偏好P与约束C互动模型的VSBPC模型，李涛，2016），提出群体偏好的资源支配者说，构建三人匹配博弈模型来解释公共池塘资源（the common pool resources,CPR）提取监督博弈模型（E. Ostrom，1990）难以解释的现象：业主疏离于业主自治组织成立伊始，缠斗于业主自治组织成立之后。.研究发现，决策者是资源支配者，其依循权力、互惠和权利三种规则（资源支配方式）行事是人的本性或李建德（2019）之“非理性信念”，并孳生出群体的控制权偏好、信任偏好和信用偏好；群体偏好异质性使资源提供者与提取者匹配博弈呈现不同类型，业主自治大多始于互惠型资源支配者主导的"白手起家博弈"，终于权利型资源支配者主导的"明日黄花博弈"。总体上，治理困境是由主导群体行为的资源支配方式不同所致，故行政力量需因势利导，或以互惠规则推动之，或以权利规则巩固之，或以权力规则监督之。.相关研究还包括群体偏好的经验证据、业主群体偏好识别、住房专项维修资金提取效率、内生制度绩效与程序正当、自我意识与履约行为、城市住宅小区居住者权等问题，并形成了近千例司法判决、六百多个小区住宅专项维修资金使用信息的数据集。.科学意义：资源支配方式是社会互动的结果，并引导社会互动的发生，因而，群体中依循不同资源支配方式行事的成员分布就是群体偏好；群体偏好是群体成员的共同信息内化的行为习惯，也可以称为群体规范；人们对于群体规范的自愿遵从就形成了制度。当社会角色是依循资源支配方式行事的行为人时，资源支配方式存在于人性中，使得行为人天然存在马克思所谓“人的社会性”。“资源支配者”概念，比奥斯特罗姆的“行为人”向马克思的“社会人”更近了一步。由此，个人行为（规则依循）、群体行为（群体偏好）与制度（业主自治）进入统一框架，有望为研究集体行动提供一个新范式。