工程项目双重治理机制及其边界条件研究

As a temporary organization, construction project is comprised of multiple interacting organizations with heterogeneous objectives. Moreover, construction project is characterized by high transaction amount, strong asset specificity, and severe information asymmetry. As a result, opportunism and behavioral conflicts can occur easily during construction, which may lead to considerable efficiency loss. Previous studies suggest that contract and trust are two important mechanisms to promote cooperation. However, these studies examine the function of contract and trust based on a single dimension or statically, and conclude that contract and trust are either substitutes or complements – a “relational paradox”. In contrast, by viewing cooperation as a dynamic relationship, this research attempts to investigate how contract and trust based on multi-dimension can promote cooperative behaviors of participating organizations and thus reduce opportunism and behavioral conflicts. To be specific, this research attempts to investigate the respective impact of contract and evolving trust on behaviors of participating organizations, and to explore how and under what conditions do contract and trust interact in shaping cooperation in the construction project. This research aims to provide deep insight into interacting roles of contract and trust, to resolve the “relationship paradox” of contractual governance and trust based governance, to enrich knowledge regarding project governance, and to provide theoretical support for practitioners in designing governance mechanisms to promote cooperation in the construction project.

工程项目是由大量交互且目标异质的参与方组成的临时性组织，同时具有交易额度高、资产专用性强、信息不对称严重等特点，极易引发机会主义行为和行为冲突，严重影响了工程项目的实施效率。本课题拟以工程项目为研究对象，从双重治理的视角研究如何通过合约治理与信任治理促进项目参与方的合作行为，以减少机会主义行为和行为冲突。现有研究多采用单维度或静态的视角，出现了合约治理与信任治理替代或互补的“关系悖论”，本课题从多维度和动态的视角，探究工程项目合约对参与方合作行为的影响机理及其边界条件；剖析动态演化的信任对参与方合作行为的作用机理及其边界条件；揭开工程项目合约与信任对参与方合作行为的动态交互作用机理及其边界条件。本课题的研究成果将深化对工程项目合约与信任双重治理机制的认知，揭示工程项目合约治理与信任治理的替代或互补的“关系悖论”，拓展现有的工程项目治理知识体系，并为工程项目参与方设计治理机制提供理论支持。

我国工程项目投资规模越来越大，由于工程项目资产专用性强、参与方目标不一致、信息高度不对称，机会主义行为与冲突多发，给工程项目的实施造成了严重影响。探究如何通过治理激励项目参与方合作，以减少项目参与方的机会主义行为和冲突，提高工程项目资金的使用效率，是目前工程实业界与学术界亟待解决的问题。本课题从多维度的视角研究了工程项目合约对参与方合作行为的影响机理，并识别了合约治理的边界条件；通过案例研究识别了工程项目中信任的动态演化路径，在此基础上，探索信任对参与方合作行为的作用机理及其边界条件；通过实证研究的方法探究工程项目合约与信任对参与方合作行为的动态交互作用机理，构建了不同边界条件下，合约、信任与合作行为的整合模型。研究期间，课题组共发表（包括已录用）23篇与课题直接相关论文，其中22篇国际期刊论文， 1篇国内核心期刊论文。课题成果中有20篇被SCI（SSCI）检索的已发表（包括已录用）论文，12篇被EI检索的已发表论文。本课题研究成果有利于在理论上诠释经济交易中合约治理与信任治理的替代或互补的“关系悖论”，加深治理机制间相互作用关系以及对合作行为交互作用的认知，拓展现有的工程项目治理知识体系，在实践中为我国工程项目参与方设计治理机制、减少机会主义行为与行为冲突提供决策依据。