考虑价格歧视和广告效应的网络团购销售策略研究

With the increasing of industry profits, effectively improving sales revenue becomes the key point to develop sustainably for both online group buying sellers and the entire industry. This project intends to build theoretical models revealing the basic effect of price discrimination and advertising of group buying, and to design feasible and effective sales strategies for the group buying sellers, using revenue management, game theory, robust optimization, and other theories and methods of management science. We will mainly deal with two types of group buying, i.e., Groupon mechanism and Package Deal mechanism in this project. First, considering consumers’ participation cost and its diversity, we will analyze the necessary conditions adopting discriminatory prices during group buying from the point of view of revenue maximization. Second, considering consumers’ information cost and its diversity, we will study the advertising effect of group buying focusing on “word-of-mouth” effect and repeat purchasing; Third, considering the common scenario where the sellers provide group buying through a third party platform, this project will also research the co-opetition relationship between sellers and platform from the perspective of game theory. Based on these, we will refine the decision variables of “group-buying-retailing” joint decision problems and build optimization models according to specific market situations. For the proposed models, we will also design theoretical strategies and algorithms and analyze the solutions’ feasibility and effectiveness from the point of view of practice. Meanwhile, we will also compare theoretical results with numerical analysis, and improve the proposed theoretical models and strategies, which we hope can provide useful theoretical support for online group buying practice.

随着网络团购行业利润“倍增期”的到来，有效增加销售收益成为销售商乃至整个行业持续发展的关键。项目拟采用收益管理、博弈论、鲁棒优化等理论与方法，构建理论模型，揭示网络团购在价格歧视和广告效应两方面的本质作用，为销售商设计切实有效的团购销售策略。项目将分别以Groupon式团购和套餐团购为对象，考虑消费者团购参与成本及其差异，从收益最大化角度分析销售商通过“团购-零售”联合销售策略采用价格歧视的必要条件；考虑消费者信息传播成本及其差异，从口头传播和增加回头客角度，研究网络团购的广告宣传效应；考虑销售商通过第三方平台发布团购信息的现实情况，从博弈论角度研究销售商、第三方平台、同类销售商之间的竞合关系。在此基础上，结合具体的市场情景，提炼“团购-零售”联合销售策略的决策变量，构建优化模型，设计相应的求解算法，分析理论解的实践可行性与有效性，并结合数值分析，完善理论模型，为网络团购实践提供理论支持。

在网络团购发展的新阶段，理论界和业界都把关注点从战略层的平台建设及网站融资转移到了运作层的销售策略设计上来，销售商能否从网络团购中获得期望收益正是网络团购行业能否持续发展的关键所在。基于此，本项目从销售商收益最大化的角度，结合我国网络团购的新特点，对网络团购的适用条件及优化策略展开了理论研究。本项目总体上完成了预期目标，按计划主要研究了“基于消费限制的网络团购歧视价格决策及其效应分析”、“考虑消费者网络广告效应的团购最优定价策略”、“考虑平台佣金和服务水平的网络团购博弈策略”、“需求信息不确定下的最优歧视价格策略”等方面的研究内容，相应的研究结果和管理启示总结如下。.第一，消费限制感知成本差异对最优歧视价格的销售收益有正向作用，但是当感知成本差异超过一定上限时，对销售收益的影响将保持不变；在特定市场条件下，歧视价格策略对需求和消费者剩余有相反的影响，而在某些条件下，歧视价格策略对需求和消费者剩余都有正向影响。.第二，当网络广告效应足够大时，团购策略优于零售策略。销售商同时提供团购和零售的混合策略总是优于只提供零售策略。但是团购策略和混合策略的优劣性取决于具体的市场情形。此外，团购策略与零售策略相比，还能有效增加总销售量，有利于开拓市场。.第三，团购平台的服务效率是影响双方收益的重要因素，服务效率存在一个下限，当效率低于该下限时，商家不会选择参与团购。而佣金对参与模型的影响相对复杂，当佣金较低时，适当提高佣金，对双方都有利。当佣金较高时，适当降低佣金，对双方收益也是有利的。只有当佣金适中时，平台和商家才存在“讨价还价”的问题。.第四，针对需求信息不确定下的最优歧视价格策略设计问题，考虑易逝性商品的本身特点，在各类需求信息未知的情况下，从在线算法与竞争分析的角度，制定了“有等级商品”的在线销售策略。这些理论结果对于决策者，尤其是风险规避型决策者而言，具有一定的借鉴价值。