基于随机微分博弈的发电市场碳减排机制研究

The power industry is a major source of China's carbon dioxide emissions, and low-carbon electric power is an important way to achieve the national low-carbon economic development strategy,and the mechanisms of carbon emission reduction in generation power market is vital to the development of low-carbon electric power, but the related theoretical literature from the view of mechanism design hasn't been reported at present..The project intends to present a three-stage stochastic differential game model basted on mechanism design theory, and integrated using of option game, Monte Carlo simulation, econometrics, and other related theories and methods, to explore theoretically the mechanism of carbon emission reduction in generation power market and its optimal energy policy.With the backward induction ideas of dynamic game, the project researchs in turn following main content: the power transaction strategies of oligopoly suppliers and its quantitative characterization with the constraint of carbon emission reduction mechanism, the conditions of oligopoly suppliers to accept the mechanism of carbon emission reduction under multiple uncertainties, the mechanism design of carbon emission reduction in generation power market, and the policies to promote the formation of mechanism carbon emission reduction. The project attempts to apply stochastic differetial game to the mechanism design of carbon emission reduction,its aim is to form the equilibrium theory of carbon emission reduction in generation power market under government regulation, and expand the research fields of stochastic differential game to some certain extent.

电力行业是我国二氧化碳排放的主要来源之一，因此低碳电力是实现国家低碳经济发展战略的重要途径，而发电市场的碳减排机制能否形成对低碳电力的发展至关重要，但目前从机制设计角度对其进行理论探讨的文献尚未见报道。.本项目拟运用机制设计理论，融合期权博弈、Monte Carlo仿真以及计量经济学等理论与方法，通过构造三阶段的随机微分博弈模型，从理论上探讨发电市场碳减排机制及与之相对应的最优能源政策。按动态博弈逆向归纳分析思路，本项目拟依次研究以下内容：碳减排机制约束下寡头发电商的电量交易策略及其数量刻画；多重不确定条件下寡头发电商接受碳减排机制的条件分析；发电市场碳减排机制设计；有利于发电市场碳减排均衡机制形成的政策研究。本项目尝试将随机微分博弈理论运用于碳减排机制设计，力图形成政府规制下的发电市场碳减排均衡机制理论，也可望在一定程度内拓展随机微分博弈理论的研究范畴。

发电行业是我国二氧化碳的主要来源之一，因此探讨火力发电市场的碳减排均衡机制具有非常重要的意义。项目主要进行了以下几方面的研究：1）碳价波动性的实证性检验；2）设计碳排放约束下的寡头发电商电量上网机制，分析碳排放对发电商市场行为的影响；3）分别讨论上网电价、竞争性电量比重、碳排放标准、差价合约、价格限制等政策性参数对寡头发电商碳减排投资的影响；4）政策不确定性对寡头发电商投资的影响，讨论政策调整的最优时机等；5）电力需求与碳价双重不确定条件下，寡头发电商的碳减排投资策略与市场均衡政策；6）基于碳减排损失函数，探讨均衡的碳减排机制及其诱导政策组合。部分重要的研究结论有：1）碳排放约束下的寡头发电商电量上网机制，不但可实现总发电成本最小之目标，还可诱导高排放发电商自动进行碳减排投资或退出市场；2）规制机构在选择CCS投资激励政策时，首先要选择合适的碳价下限，然后再考虑投资补贴，应尽量避免税收减免；3）存在一个上网电价门槛值，当且仅当上网电价高于该门槛值时，高排放发电商才会领先进行碳减排投资；4）碳排放标准并不是越严越有利于减排，过严的碳排放标准可能会延迟高排放发电商的碳减排投资；5）存在一个收益下限阈值，当且仅当收益下限大于该阈值，收益下限规制才是有效的，但是否存在最优的收益下限，则与损失函数的参数选取有关。上述研究在一定程度内拓展了Roques,Savva (2009)和Dangl(1999)等文献的研究，得到的部分研究结论在一定程度内可望为发电市场激励性碳减排政策出台，提供理论支撑。