审计与腐败治理：理论、路径与效果

This project focuses on the control of bureaucratic corruption and SOEs’ (state-owned enterprises) managerial corruption in China from an audit perspective. First, we make a thorough analysis on the incentives, opportunities, and conditions that leads bureaucrats and managers to corrupt, based on the principle-agent theory, rent-seeking theory, and public choice theory; and reveal the underlying expropriation and interest transferring paths behind corruption, and the clues left in government financial revenue and expenditure accounts as well as SOE’s assets, debts, and profit accounts. Then, we analyze why and how government audit institutions and internal audit functions can play an important role in curbing corruption, and identify the key factors attribute to their audit efficiency. Finally, based on the institutional background and governance practices in China, we empirically test the effects of government audit institutions and internal audit functions in monitoring and control bureaucratic corruption and SOEs’ managerial corruption, and provide suggestions to government, SOEs, and other related parties. This research can help us to more accurately understand the occurrence mechanisms and expropriation and interest transferring characteristics of bureaucratic corruption and SOEs’ managerial corruption, and to understand why and how internal and external mechanisms can play an important role in corruption monitoring and control. The results of this research have important implications for the improvement of audit mechanisms and the design of anti-corruption strategies.

本课题从审计视角研究政府官员和国企高管腐败问题。首先，运用委托代理理论、权力寻租理论和公共选择理论剖析腐败的动因、机会和条件，从财务和会计视角揭示腐败背后的利益侵占和输送路径及其在公共财政收支和企业财务报表数据上的表现，为审计介入腐败治理奠定理论基础。然后，在委托代理框架下，运用治理理论、审计理论和内部控制理论，推导审计介入腐败治理的理论逻辑，梳理审计介入腐败治理的具体路径，归纳影响审计监控效率的关键因素。最后，结合我国的制度背景和治理实践，对政府审计和内部审计监控政府官员腐败、国企高管腐败的实际效果进行检验，并提出政策建议。本课题的研究能够加深对腐败风险来源、行为特征及审计治理腐败的作用机理的理解，研究结果对政府部门和国有企业审计机制的改进和腐败治理策略的完善具有重要的参考价值。

本课题从审计视角对政府官员和国企高管腐败问题做了研究，具体包括：（1）剖析腐败的动因、机会和条件，揭示其利益侵占和输送路径及对公共财政收支和企业财务报表的影响；（2）归纳审计介入腐败治理的理论逻辑、具体路径和影响审计监控效率的关键因素，探索审计与内部控制、巡视监督、交易所监管等治理机制的协调；（3）结合我国的制度背景和治理实践，检验审计监控腐败的实际效果及审计和其他监督机制改革的影响。.研究认为，官员自由裁量权和高管管理自主权的存在为腐败提供了条件，在职消费、过度投资、大股东“掏空”及利益输送是常见的腐败手段，并且可能通过避税和利润操纵加以掩盖和修饰，其结果是降低企业和公共部门效率。审计和内部控制、党委巡视、交易所监管通过对权力加以制衡，提高官员和管理层机会主义行为被发现和问责的概率，抑制其自利动机，从而减少官员和高管腐败，提升政府和企业经营效率。基于审计署和地方审计机关的审计结果及我国A股上市公司的相关数据，本课题证实了审计在抑制高管腐败和企业避税、提升政府投资效率方面的作用及相应的渠道机制。.围绕审计全覆盖背景下政府审计与社会审计力量的融合、“地方审计机关人财物统一管理”改革、关键审计事项披露以及资本市场上交易所一线监管的变化，本课题采用案例研究和大样本分析方法，就镇街审计外包中的业务质量控制、人财物统管与审计效率提升、关键审计事项披露以及问询函监管对审计和内部控制质量的促进作用开展研究。此外，研究还发现，党委巡视能显著降低地方政府债务风险，问询函监管有助于抑制过度投资和大股东“掏空”行为。.本课题的研究能够加深对腐败风险来源、行为特征及审计治理腐败的作用机理的理解，研究结果对政府部门和国有企业深化审计监督，强化审计与内部控制、党委巡视、交易所监管等治理机制的协调互动，完善腐败治理策略具有重要的参考价值。