关系型稳定供应商的过度利益输送行为、保荐机构鉴证效应与IPO定价

Due to lack of database and less important to customer, there is no literature focus on the relationship between supplier and its customer’s IPO underpricing. Supplier is very important in the Chinese market, sponsor needs to pay attention on the supplier, the issuance examination commission needs to audit the supplier’s interest transfer behavior and IPO firm needs to disclose information about supplier in the prospectus. Based on the IPO pricing theory and the supply chain theory, using a unique database in China, this project is intended to investigate the following questions: Whether the related stable supplier transfer too much interest to its IPO customer firm? Whether the sponsor can play an identification role? Whether the market investors can identify it and give a lower price? The project anticipate: First, stable supplier may monitor and support its IPO firm, lead to a lower IPO underpricing. If the supplier and its customer IPO firm have a related relationship, the negative relationship between stable supplier and IPO underpricing will be less significant. Second, stable supplier transfer interest to its IPO customer. When IPO firm is related with their supplier, the transfer behavior will be much more serious. The market investors can identify this behavior and give a lower price. Third, Higher reputation sponsor can restrain the benefit transmission behavior, and improve the pricing effect of the supplier information. This project may provide a new explanation on IPO underpricing from the perspective of suppliers, and can examine whether the SEC supervision tools are effective. This project expect to enrich the IPO underpricing and supplier-customer relationship literature, and provide some policy suggestion to policy regulators and investors.

由于数据匮乏和供应商之于客户重要性偏弱，尚无文献研究供应商的IPO定价效应。中国市场上供应商是重要的实践话题，保荐机构需关注供应商特征，发审委需审核供应商的利益输送行为，IPO企业需披露供应商信息。利用中国特有的供应商数据，基于IPO定价理论与供应链管理理论，本项目拟研究：关系型稳定供应商是否向IPO企业输送了过多利益？保荐机构能否鉴证？市场能否识别？本项目预期：（1）稳定供应商更可能监督与支持企业进而降低IPO抑价，企业与供应商的关联关系可削弱稳定供应商对IPO抑价的降低效应；（2）稳定供应商对IPO企业存在利益输送行为，关系型稳定供应商的利益输送行为更加严重，市场能识别并给予较低定价；（3）高声誉保荐机构能抑制供应商的过度利益输送行为，提高定价效应。本项目能从供应商角度为IPO抑价提供新的解释，也能检验监管制度的合理性，有助于丰富IPO抑价与供应商客户关系文献，为监管机构提供政策建议。

由于数据匮乏和供应商之于客户重要性偏弱，尚无文献研究供应商的IPO定价效应。中国市场上供应商是重要的实践话题，保荐机构需关注供应商特征，发审委需审核供应商的利益输送行为，IPO企业需披露供应商信息。利用中国特有的供应商数据，基于IPO定价理论与供应链管理理论，本项目主要研究以下三个问题：关系型稳定供应商是否向IPO企业输送了过多利益？保荐机构能否鉴证？市场能否识别？本项目研究主要发现：（1）稳定供应商更可能监督与支持企业进而降低IPO抑价，企业与供应商的关联关系可削弱稳定供应商对IPO抑价的降低效应；（2）稳定供应商对IPO企业存在利益输送行为，关系型稳定供应商的利益输送行为更加严重，市场能识别并给予较低定价；（3）高声誉保荐机构、审计师、分析师等金融中介能抑制供应商的过度利益输送行为，提高定价效应。本项目从供应商角度为IPO抑价提供了新的解释，也检验并证实了中国监管制度的合理性，有助于丰富IPO抑价与供应商客户关系文献，可为监管机构提供政策建议。