柔性契约治理结构：不确定情景下柔性与刚性的平衡机制研究

Infrastructure PPPs contract requires complex administrative supervision to adapt to the high degree of uncertainty, and ensure the partners' commitment to the contract within a long-term framework at the same time. This project studies the flexible design of PPPs contracts from the perspective of the relational contract to guarantee rigidity while responding to uncertainty. First,Based on incomplete contract theory, three levels of contract uncertainty are caused by the analysis of incomplete contract theory, to describe the classification of the incompleteness of the contract; Second,Based on the basis of establishing the response matrix of individual flexibility to uncertainty, to study the flexible space measurement according to the factor analysis method; Third,Aiming at the timing disclosure and information sharing characteristics of incomplete information in flexible contracts, an endogenous opportunistic game is established to study the consideration of asymmetric information in terms of flexibility, in order to clarify the early warning of endogenous moral risks of flexible contracts; Finally,To clarify the adaptive response of flexibility to uncertainty by establishing the renegotiation mechanism of the clause and implementation flexibility and designing flexible program，The validity and reliability of the model are verified by the method of SPSS regression analysis, and the evolution of the internal relationship between flexibility and management performance is described by the evolution of the contract mechanism。 By means of the evolution of the contractual mechanism, to study the optimal contract governance structure from the microeconomic interrelationship, and to the re-examine true nature of the “dilemma associated to economic coordination”.

基础设施PPP契约管理需要复杂的行政监管等措施，以适应高度的不确定性，来确保合作伙伴在长期框架内对契约的承诺。本项目在契约理论下研究PPP契约的柔性设计，以促进响应不确定性的同时坚守刚性。（1）依据不完全契约理论分析引起契约不确定性的三个层面，确定影响契约不完全性的关键因素；(2）在建立个体柔性对不确定性的反应矩阵基础上，依据因子分析方法，度量契约柔性空间大小；(3）针对执行过程中不完全信息的时机披露与共享特点，建立内生时机博弈模型,研究柔性对内生道德风险的预警；(4）通过对执行柔性中再谈判机制的构建，以明确契约对不确定性的响应；并用SPSS回归分析的方法验证上述模型的效度和信度，刻画柔性与管理绩效的内在关联。从微观经济相互关联来研究PPP契约结构的演变，重新审视“与经济协调相联系的困境”的真正本质。

针对工程项目PPP契约的柔性条款的影响因素以及契约柔性与刚性的最佳平衡设置为研究目标，依托国家公园体制管理契约设计和政府主导的项目管理中政府承诺对契约的实现以及项目效率的分析，研究契约柔性对高度的不确定性的刻画,用以确保合作契约的顺利实施的考量因素。我们具体研究获得如下的成果：（1）针对柔性契约自我执行激励问题,阐明契约柔性不同协调条款的细节:动机、原则、保持压力的方法、冲突的解决等,研究契约柔性机制的演变,刻画对协调机制的最佳治理结构,拓展了柔性机制在契约最佳治理结构中的内涵,为PPPs契约的完善提供了可操作的路径。（2）针对柔性契约中政府主导地位强弱和承诺的柔性刻画,研究契约中主导型的政府承诺对契约柔性的影响研究，采用实证研究方法,研究契约柔性对项目效果的影响机制,研究结果表明:补偿性项目契约中柔性空间与项目结果存在显著的反相关关系。（3）针对柔性契约对不确定性的响应机理,基于生态补偿PPP契约项目,政府主导的PPP项目契约调查，在充分认识或然契约、从范围 、收益、纠纷解决、再谈判等条款设置上,研究契约柔性与刚性的最佳平衡设置。提出执行柔性的再谈判机制构建。