种植业保险中农户逆向选择及道德风险的检验

Based on the current system of agricultural insurance, in order to identify the influence of farmers' risk on their insurance decision, and increase understanding about operation and management of the insured and non- insured farmer, and test the extent of information asymmetry in planting insurance, this study empirical verify farmers' adverse selection and moral hazard according to the survey data from planting-farmers in Inner Mongolia. Its innovation point in research ideas has two aspects: Firstly, it differentiates farmers' subjective risk and objective risk, and respectively tests the relativity between two risks and farmers' insurance decision, which will make the test on farmers' adverse selection has higher robustness; Secondly, this study measures farmers' ex ante and ex post moral hazard, which is beneficial to scientifically indentify influence and significance of farmers' insurance decision on their behavior of production and operation. The conclusion of this study can provide empirical support to correctly understand the effectiveness of existing system of agricultural insurance, and offer theoretical basis to further improve the policy choice of system.

为了识别在当前农业保险制度下，农户风险水平对其参保决策行为的影响程度，增强对参保与不参保农户经营管理行为的科学理解，检验种植业保险市场中信息不对称的程度，本研究基于对内蒙古种植业农户的实地调研数据，实证检验种植业保险中农户的逆向选择及道德风险问题。本研究在研究思路方面的创新表现为：首先，通过区分农户主观风险与客观风险两类不同的风险因素，进而衡量二者各自与与农户参保决策的相关性，二者相互补充，使得本研究对农户逆向选择的检验更加稳健；其次，通过检验农户的事前道德风险与事后道德风险，以科学识别农户参加保险对其生产经营行为的影响和显著性。本研究的结论可以对正确认识我国现行农业保险制度的有效性提供实证支持，还可以对进一步完善农业保险制度的政策选择提供理论基础。

本研究在对内蒙古自治区政策性农业保险发展状况做深入细致考察的基础上，用大量数据和案例分析了不同主体的道德风险和逆向选择的表现形式。 实证检验了内蒙古现行农业保险制度下，农业保险实施中的道德风险及逆向选择风险。分析了农牧户对政策性农业保险的认知及评价，并实证检验了农业保险对农户的收入效应。研究发现：农业保险中三方主体均存在道德风险问题；农户的确存在逆向选择行为，但并不严重；内蒙古现行农业保险尚难以发挥稳定农户收入的政策效应。上述研究结论为进一步优化我国农业保险运行机制和创新农业保险产品提供了方向及路径，对出台促进农业保险可持续发展的政策提供决策依据。