薪酬差距、国有企业创新与投资效率研究

We investigate the effects of pay dispersion between executives and employees on state-owned enterprises’ innovation, and its possible economic consequences. We will mainly focus on the following questions. First, what do the main factors affect the pay dispersion of state-owned enterprises, and whether they reflect the effective contracting view or the managerial power view in theory? Whether the pay dispersion is able to promote state-owned enterprises to develop more innovative activities? Second, whether the promotion effect of pay dispersion on state-owned enterprises’ innovation is derived from incentive effects on top managers? Third, how can the executives’ political connection influence the pay dispersion’s incentive effects on top manages? Forth, whether the promotion effect of pay dispersion on innovation improve state-owned enterprises’ investment efficiency. These theoretical researches belong to frontier and hot spot of the international academic. They will deepen the related research on effective contract view and managerial power view of executives’ compensation incentive, and have significant contributions for the related analysis of firm innovation’s influencing factors. At the same time, our research will not only provide new empirical evidence for the economic consequences of the pay dispersion between state-owned executives and employees from the perspective of innovation, but also provides new explanation for the specific mechanism through which the pay dispersion influence state-owned enterprises’ innovative activities from the perspective of manager incentive. What’s more, our research results will be conducive to clarify the controversy on “limit orders on executives’ compensation” from the point of pay dispersion, and have important policy implications for further promoting the reform of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in China.

近年来，国有企业高管与普通员工之间持续扩大的薪酬差距受到社会各界的广泛关注。本课题研究国有企业高管与员工之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响及其经济后果，具体拟回答以下问题：第一，薪酬差距是否能促进国有企业开展更多的创新活动？第二，薪酬差距对国有企业创新的促进作用是否源自对高管的激励效应，在理论上体现了有效薪酬契约观还是管理层权力观？第三，高管的政治背景如何影响薪酬差距对国有企业高管的激励效应？第四，薪酬差距的这种创新促进作用是否提高了国有企业的投资效率？本课题能在理论上拓展和深化解释高管薪酬激励的有效薪酬契约观和管理层权力观的相关研究，不仅从企业创新的视角为薪酬差距的经济后果提供新的证据，也从管理者激励的视角为薪酬差距通过何种具体机制影响企业绩效提供新的解释。本课题在实践上有助于从薪酬差距的视角澄清有关国有企业高管“限薪令”的争议，为中国国有企业进一步的高管薪酬制度改革提供理论依据和政策参考。

近年来，国有企业高管与普通员工之间持续扩大的薪酬差距受到社会各界的广泛关注。本课题研究国有企业高管与员工之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响以及高管薪酬契约的经济后果。具体来说，课题研究回答了以下四个问题：第一，薪酬差距是否能促进国有企业开展更多的创新活动？第二，薪酬差距对国有企业创新的促进作用是否源自对高管的激励效应，在理论上体现了有效薪酬契约观还是管理层权力观？第三，高管的政治背景如何影响薪酬差距对国有企业高管的激励效应？第四，薪酬差距的这种创新促进作用是否提高了国有企业的投资效率？以中国A股沪深两市的国有上市公司为样本，课题检验结果发现：（1）内部薪酬差距越大，企业开展显著更多的创新活动，反映出薪酬差距对企业创新的促进作用。（2）薪酬差距对企业创新的促进效应在有政府任职经历的管理者所在企业显著更弱，这表明薪酬激励在一定程度上被行政晋升激励替代。（3）管理者权力没有弱化薪酬差距与企业创新之间的正相关关系，反映出薪酬差距的确对国有企业管理者具有重要的激励效应。（4）薪酬差距的创新促进作用提升了国有企业的投资效率。上述研究在理论上拓展和深化了解释高管薪酬激励的有效薪酬契约观和管理层权力观的相关研究，不仅从企业创新的视角为薪酬差距的经济后果提供新的证据，也从管理者激励的视角为薪酬差距通过何种具体机制影响企业绩效提供新的解释。本课题的研究结论在实践上有助于从薪酬差距的视角澄清有关国有企业高管“限薪令”的争议，为中国国有企业进一步的高管薪酬制度改革以及治理改革提供了理论依据和政策参考。