粘性薪酬对高管研发投资决策及其绩效的影响：基于失败容忍理论视角

Executives prone to opportunistic behavior such as ex ante risk-aversion and expost appropriation of innovation resources in R&D investment. Consequently, how to incentive and restraint executives to conduct effective R&D investment through reasonable compensation contractual arrangement, which is truly an important theoretical and practical problem to be resolved in the government, business and academia. Based on the realistic background of symmetric relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, and under the new theory of failure tolerance, this project theoretical analyses and applies the data of Chinese listed companies to empirical test: (1)the “double-edged sword” effect such as “encourage risk-taking” and “connivance risk seeking” of stickiness compensation on executive R&D investment decision; (2)the dual effect such as "reasonable incentive" and "excessive incentive" of stickiness compensation on executive R&D investment performance. Then we further analyze the main moderating factors of the effect mentioned above, and further estimate the reasonable range of executive compensation stickiness of Chinese listed companies in terms of innovation oriented. Finally, conclusions and policy recommendations are summarized. Theoretically, this project could help to identify and discover an objective existence but long neglected compensation mechanism, which has an important influence on the executive R&D investment decision. In practice, this project has important reference value for Chinese enterprises to design more reasonable innovation-oriented executive compensation contract based on the consideration of failure tolerance.

由于高管在研发投资方面容易产生事前风险规避和事后侵占研发资源的机会主义行为。因此，如何通过合理的薪酬机制激励和约束高管进行有效的研发投资，一直是政府、企业和学术界亟待解决的重要理论与实践难题。本项目根植于现实企业中普遍存在的高管薪酬业绩非对称相关现象，在失败容忍的全新理论视域下，理论分析并采用中国上市公司数据实证检验：①粘性薪酬在影响高管研发投资决策方面具有的“鼓励风险承担”和“纵容风险寻求”的“双刃剑”效应；②粘性薪酬对高管研发投资绩效的“合理激励”与“激励过度”的双重影响效应。在此基础上，进一步探究上述影响效应的主要调节因素及实证测算研发创新导向下高管薪酬粘性的合理程度区间；最后归纳研究结论和政策建议。本项目有助于从理论上识别和发现一种客观存在但被长期忽视的影响高管研发投资决策的重要薪酬机制；在实践上对中国企业基于失败容忍考量设计更为合理的研发创新导向型的高管薪酬契约具有重要参考价值。

在由模仿创新向自主创新过渡的关键转型期，中国企业所面临的创新风险和失败概率空前增加。构建具有创新容错激励效应的高管激励机制尤为重要。薪酬粘性现象在世界各国企业中普遍存在并成为高管薪酬机制中的重要组成部分。根据失败容忍理论的逻辑和观点，粘性薪酬机制具有的“失败容忍”和“重奖轻罚”的特性，在某种程度上恰好契合了研发创新导向型高管薪酬激励机制的要求。本项目基于失败容忍这一全新理论视角，系统探讨：（1）粘性薪酬对高管研发投资决策具有何种影响？（2）粘性薪酬是否会影响高管研发投资决策的价值效应？（3）粘性薪酬影响高管研发投资决策及其绩效的主要调节因素及其作用？（4）研发创新导向下高管薪酬粘性的合理程度区间。.本项目主要研究结果是：（1）高管粘性薪酬机制对企业研发投入具有显著的正向影响，提高高管薪酬粘性程度有利于激励企业高管进行更多研发创新投资；相对于国有企业和高新技术企业而言，粘性薪酬机制对非国有企业和非高新技术企业研发投入的正向促进效应更强；企业所辖省区的市场化程度越低，粘性薪酬机制的创新激励效应会越强。（2）总体上粘性薪酬机制对企业专利产出具有显著的正向影响效应，提高失败容忍程度将促进企业专利产出总量增加；基于专利分类的进一步分析发现，粘性薪酬机制对不同风险类型创新产出的影响效应存在明显异质性，表现为董事会失败容忍对低风险性的非发明专利总体上具有显著的正向影响，而对高风险性的发明专利的影响呈现非线性的倒U型结构特征；粘性薪酬机制对企业创新产出的影响兼具“合理激励”和“激励过度”的双重作用效应，在促进企业专利产出增加的同时也可能诱发“专利泡沫”现象。.本项目的研究结果在理论上为Manso（2011）等文献构建的失败容忍理论提供了董事会治理层面的中国经验证据，并对该理论形成了一定拓展；在实践上对创新模式转型期的中国企业构建具有创新容错激励效应的公司治理机制和营造宽容失败的创新氛围具有一定启示意义。