基于演化博弈的煤矿安全监管机制研究

The main reason for the frequent occurrence of coal mine safety accidents lies in the lack and inefficiency of coal mine safety supervision. In the coal mine safety supervision, the state regulatory authorities and the local regulatory authorities, the local regulatory authorities and the coal mining enterprises, the coal mining enterprises and the miners conduct three types of interest game. Due to the incomplete information and environmental complexity and other factors, the game participants often have limited rational characteristics. Based on evolutionary game theory, the mechanism design of coal mine safety supervision is studied. Consider whether the coal mining enterprises and the local regulatory authorities conduct conspiracy or not, the evolution game of coal mine safety supervision under conspiracy and no conspiracy are studied respectively. The dynamic equation of replication is established, and the stability of the equilibrium process is obtained by using the stability principle of the differential equation. The stability of the equilibrium point is analyzed and the corresponding coal mine safety supervision mechanism is obtained. The simulation experiments are carried out to drawing phase diagram, and the impact of conspiracy on coal mine safety supervision process is analyzed and quantified. The empirical analysis compares the theoretical results with the case of coal mine supervision industry to test the effectiveness and applicability of the regulatory mechanism, and provides suggestions for the government departments and enterprises to formulate corresponding supervision measures.

煤矿安全事故频发的重要原因在于煤矿安全监管的缺失与无效。在煤矿安全监管中，国家监管部门与地方监管部门、地方监管部门与煤矿企业、煤矿企业与矿工分别进行三类利益博弈。由于受到信息不完全和环境复杂性等因素的影响，博弈参与人往往具备有限理性特征。基于演化博弈理论，研究煤矿安全监管的机制设计问题。考虑煤矿企业与地方监管部门是否进行合谋，分别研究无合谋行为下煤矿安全监管演化博弈与有合谋行为下煤矿安全监管演化博弈。建立复制动态方程，利用微分方程的稳定性原理，获得演化过程的平衡点，对平衡点的稳定性进行分析，获得相应的煤矿安全监管机制。进行仿真实验，绘制相位图，分析并量化合谋行为对煤矿安全监管过程的影响。实证分析将理论结果与煤矿监管行业案例进行对比研究，以检验监管机制的有效性与适用性，为政府部门与企业制定相应的监管措施提供建议。

煤矿安全事故频发的重要原因在于煤矿安全监管机制的缺失与无效。在煤矿安全监管中，国家监察部门与地方监管部门、地方监管部门与煤矿企业、煤矿企业与矿工等分别进行多类博弈。针对博弈参与人的有限理性特征，基于演化博弈理论研究煤矿安全监管的机制设计问题。依据煤矿企业与地方监管部门是否进行合谋，分别研究无合谋行为下煤矿安全监管演化博弈与有合谋行为下煤矿安全监管演化博弈。在无合谋行为前提下，研究国家监管部门、地方监管部门、煤矿企业与矿工之间的演化博弈问题，建立相应的演化博弈数学模型，求得平衡点并进行稳定性分析。在有合谋行为前提下，研究国家监管部门、联合体与矿工之间的演化博弈问题。建立复制动态方程，利用微分方程的稳定性原理获得演化过程的平衡点并对平衡点的稳定性进行分析。将理论研究结果与煤矿安全监管行业实践相结合，分析监管机制的有效性与适用性。项目按期完成了全部研究内容，达到了研究目标，完成了预期研究成果。项目研究成果可为政府部门与企业制定相应的监管措施提供建议。