市场化选聘高管对国企绩效的影响及其作用路径研究——基于管理层与公司行为的经验分析

Current studies on reforms in state-owned enterprises focus on reforms of ownership structure, such as privatization; only a few studies provide preliminary insights on non-ownership reforms. Since marketization of top management recruiting is one of the most important type of non-ownership reform, how does such reform affect performance of state-owned enterprises? What are the specific channels through which marketization of top management recruiting affect performance? How do these channels interact with each other? These are three main questions this studies will try to answer. More specifically this study has the following three main parts. First, we are going to test whether marketization of top management recruiting affects firm performance, using both accounting measures and market measures, in state-owned enterprises, and whether such impact varies in different types of state-owned enterprises. Second, based on the following agenda, 'marketization of top management recruiting->characteristics of management (incentive schemes, manager personal characteristics and management team conflicts)->firm decisions-> firm behaviors (investment, financing, production and social responsibilities)->firm performance', we test how marketization of top management affect firm performance. Last, we test how the impact of marketization on management and the impact of marketization on firm behaviors interact so that firm performance is affected. This study will help not only better evaluate current status of marketization of top management recruiting, but also provide theoretical and empirical support for the design of professional managers mechanism in state-owned enterprises in the future.

现有关于国企市场化改革的研究主要集中在“民营化”为代表的产权改革，而针对“非产权”改革的研究尚在起步阶段。国企市场化选聘高管作为近年来被广泛推广的一类重要的“非产权”改革，对国企的绩效产生了何种影响？具体作用路径如何？路径之间的内在关系如何？这是本课题主要分析的三个问题。具体而言，首先探讨国企市场化选聘高管对企业绩效（会计业绩和市场业绩）产生何种影响,并考察不同类型的国企中这种影响是否存在差异。进而按照“市场化选聘高管→改变公司管理层（激励体系，个人特征，团队冲突）→改变公司决策→改变公司行为（投资，融资，生产，履行社会责任）→影响公司绩效”这一逻辑思路结合相关理论分析其具体的作用路径。最后，分析市场化选聘高管对管理层的影响（第一层作用路径）与对公司行为的影响（第二层作用路径）之间的内在关系。本课题有助于解析中国国企市场化选聘高管现状，并为国企职业经理人制度的建立提供理论与证据支持。

市场化选聘高管作为我国国有企业改革的一条重要途径，受到了学术界和各级政府的高度关注。本课题利用央企市场化选聘作为外生冲击，实证检验了央企市场化选聘对于下属上市公司的影响。本课题按照项目申请书的安排按时完成了科研计划，已经发表了三篇学术论文，还形成了一篇核心工作论文（在Accounting Review审稿），两篇衍生工作论文（一篇在Journal of Banking and Finance期刊进行Review and Resubmit，另一篇已经在European Accounting Association Annual Meeting和American Accounting Association Annual Meeting报告，正在Accounting Review审稿）。课题申请人多次前往美国知名高校进行学术交流。在本课题资助下，完成了我国央企市场化选聘高管数据库。核心工作论文发现，相比于控制组，实验组公司的投融资、经营效率和会计业绩都没有显著不同，但是实验组公司的可操控应计项显著高于控制组，而且这种差异主要发生在集团公司发生市场化选聘之后，而不是在选聘之前。更进一步的研究发现，市场化选聘对于盈余管理的刺激作用主要发生在高管年龄较低的公司，以及公司治理较差的公司。我们还发现来自上市公司高管团队的监督可以有效的缓解市场化选聘的负面影响。随着国资委主任李荣融的卸任，市场化选聘高管再也没有在央企层面进行过。这种政策变化是否具有科学依据，需要严谨客观的实证检验。我们的研究显示，市场化选聘并没有提升国企的公司价值，反而催生出了大量的盈余管理行为。因此本课题的研究发现为评估我国央企改革提供了重要的实证证据。