上市公司管理层薪酬激励合约研究——基于委托代理与资产定价混合模型

Corporate finance theory shows that equity-based executive compensation can mitigate agency problem between shareholders and firm manager. Classical agent theory predicts that the relation between the pay performance sensitivity (PPS) and stock price volatility is negative and the relation between the PPS and firm performance is positive, but empirical results do not match the above predictions, leading to two long standing puzzles. Although some theoretical papers provide explanations for the above puzzles, but they do not take into account the impact of asset pricing mechanism on the compensation contract. In addition, the impact of asset pricing has not yet been considered in many theoretical studies related to executive compensation contracts. This study attempts to construct integrated models of principal-agent and asset pricing to discuss the relations between PPS and stock price volatility, and between the PPS and firm performance to solve the above-mentioned puzzles. Furthermore, we will discuss the relations between the PPS, firm performance and stock price informativeness, market liquidity, and the determinants of term structure of the executive compensation contracts. Considering the impact of the asset pricing mechanism in discussing the above issues is an important extension of agency theory and corporate finance theory. This study can provide explanations for the empirical results on executive compensation contracts, theoretical supports for setting up more effective compensation contracts for listed companies and for the formulation of relevant policies and regulations.

公司金融理论认为，向管理层支付激励薪酬可缓解上市公司股东与管理层之间的代理问题。经典代理理论预测，薪酬业绩敏感度与股价波动性关系为负，与公司业绩关系为正，但大量实证结果与上述预测不符，从而导致代理理论中两个重要的谜团(puzzles)。虽已有理论对上述谜团进行解释，但这些理论均未考虑资产定价机制对薪酬合约的影响。此外，许多与管理层薪酬合约相关的理论研究中，资产定价的影响尚未被考虑。本课题尝试构建委托代理与资产定价混合模型，讨论薪酬业绩敏感度与股价波动性、公司业绩的关系，进而解决上述谜团。进一步，本课题将在混合模型下讨论薪酬业绩敏感度、公司业绩与股价信息含量、市场流动性的关系，及薪酬合约期限结构的影响因素等议题。在讨论上述议题时考虑资产定价机制的影响是对代理理论和公司金融理论的重要拓展。本课题可为管理层薪酬合约相关实证结果提供解释，为上市公司设定更有效薪酬合约和相关政策法规制定提供理论依据。

公司金融理论认为，向管理层支付激励薪酬可缓解上市公司股东与管理层之间的代理问题。经典代理理论预测，薪酬业绩敏感度与股价波动性关系为负，与公司业绩关系为正，但大量实证结果与上述预测不符，从而导致代理理论中两个重要的谜团(puzzles)。虽已有理论对上述谜团进行解释，但这些理论均未考虑资产定价机制对薪酬合约的影响。此外，许多与管理层薪酬合约相关的理论研究中，资产定价的影响尚未被考虑。本课题尝试构建委托代理与资产定价混合模型，讨论薪酬业绩敏感度与股价波动性、公司业绩的关系，进而解决上述谜团。进一步，本课题将在混合模型下讨论薪酬业绩敏感度、公司业绩与股价信息含量、市场流动性的关系，及薪酬合约期限结构的影响因素等议题。在讨论上述议题时考虑资产定价机制的影响是对代理理论和公司金融理论的重要拓展。本课题可为管理层薪酬合约相关实证结果提供解释，为上市公司设定更有效薪酬合约和相关政策法规制定提供理论依据。