交易契约视角下基于平台运行的创新授权优化研究

In reality, technology licensing transactions are very common, especially, the technology with network effect trading is increasing rapidly. With the development of information network technology, more innovations run on platform. The technology licensing contract design is based on platform open standard level, technology type, innovation depth, producer market, and the technology owner or buyer view etc. . From the perspective of contract theory, the project will study on technology licensing optimization, which runs on the platform. In detail, we will discuss different types of technology licensing contracts mechanism design, which includes complete contract and incomplete contract. The complete licensing contract can be either a fixed-fee, or a royalty, or both, or auction, or cross holding of shares. . Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of licensing methods, namely exclusive and non-exclusive licensing. Innovation types include product innovation and process innovation. And the market structure can be Cournot or Stackelberg duopoly.. Technology licensing not only brings new technology applied to production but also is accompanied by the production industry market structure adjustment. The level of production industry competition is also corresponding changed. These changes have impacts on consumer surplus and social welfare.. Three important issues are addressed in the project. The first is to analysis the relationship between platform and technology. The second is to design the licensing contract, and the last is to study the influence of technology licensing, such as social welfare, cumulative innovation, and economic growth. . All of the above, the project will also develop technology licensing cases, which provide theory basis and reference to the licensing participants. Empirical analysis will be performed to get the relation between technology licensing and economy development, in order to promote licensing technology industrialization and achieve sustainable economic growth..

现实中企业间技术授权交易是非常普遍的，具有网络效应的技术交易更是日益增多。随着当代信息科技网络技术的发展，更多的创新技术运行要基于相应的平台。基于平台运行的创新技术授权契约设计，受平台标准开放程度、技术创新类型、技术革新程度、接受授权企业市场竞争格局以及基于技术拥有者或获得授权者视角等多种因素影响。本项目将从交易契约理论视角，考虑到技术运营平台的网络外部性，研究创新技术授权优化问题。具体而言，将探讨不同技术创新类型的授权契约机制设计，契约形式包括完全契约和不完全契约。剖析平台网络效应下的创新企业排他性与非排他性授权策略选择，授权交易优化产业结构机理及其对社会福利水平、后续累积创新的影响。为技术拥有企业、运营平台企业和引进创新技术企业等各方，提供授权契约设计的理论依据和案例参考，实证检验创新技术授权与经济增长的相关关系，推进创新授权技术产业化应用，以实现经济可持续性增长。

创新授权交易为技术供需双方提供了市场渠道，信息时代基于平台运营的创新授权引起国内外研究的重视。本项目基于交易契约视角，将研究拓展至不完全信息，探讨不同技术创新类型的授权契约机制设计，进而研究运行平台和创新技术互补下的授权优化问题。.本项目分析了提高产品质量的创新授权。研究表明，在排他性授权策略下，双重收费契约信息不完全使接受授权生产企业赢得更多的单位补贴；在非排他性授权策略下，不完全信息削弱了创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品市场垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下，信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能。项目进一步分析新产品创新授权对象选择。结论表明创新授权者的信息劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势。考虑授权双方市场势力，非排他性授权策略更受专利权人偏爱，并进一步增强特许权契约的吸引力。拍卖、股权投资等授权契约模式有助于创新授权企业改善信息劣势影响。项目亦探讨了不完全契约下降低成本的创新授权机制。.在此基础上，本项目建立博弈模型研究基于平台的创新授权优化问题。提出在固定、特许权收费和双重收费三种交易契约模式下，非排他性授权选择都较排他性授权更优，创造更高的社会福利。对于创新企业而言，固定收费契约较特许权收费契约可获得更多授权利润。基于平台运行的创新技术与平台间存在互补性，获得创新技术排他性授权的平台市场份额扩大，挤压了竞争对手平台的利润空间，创新技术产品由于独家运行定价较高。但创新技术排他性授权运行于单一平台，这一垄断性限制了创新技术效用发挥，损失了创新技术与其它平台互补所能创造的需求。技术运行平台的网络外部性，加快平台成长速度，缩短平台市场寡占市场形成时间，却不会影响寡占竞争格局。创新技术产品基于运行平台的网络外部性，市场大幅扩张，但仍囿于排他性授权寡占企业的市场局限性。非排他性广泛授权是基于平台运行的创新技术研发企业的更优选择。