独立财务顾问和公司并购——基于中介和监督双重作用的研究

Since the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) made clear requirements of “clear responsibility, conscientiousness, and accountability” on financial advisors in 2008, the material assets reorganization in listed firms has gradually transformed from administrative supervision depending totally on the CSRC to the market-oriented regulation dominated by independent financial advisors. As a result, the independent advisors have been entrusted with the obligation of supervision in addition to the traditional perceived intermediary role. However, there is no empirical evidence in existing literature for the effect of these two functions of independent financial advisors. Based on the special institutional background in China, this research project discusses the influence of social relations and professional competence of both independent financial advisory institutions and sponsors on M&A. Meanwhile, we take the information asymmetry (between the acquiring firm and the target firm) and agency conflicts (between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders) into our research framework and identify the role of intermediation and supervision of financial advisors. Furthermore, we explore the economic consequence of independent financial advisors from the aspect of M&A efficiency (premium rate and performance commitment) and M&A performance (market performance and financial performance). In addition to the enrichment and development of M&A theory and financial intermediation theory, this research project also complements the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory. Meanwhile, it also has revelations for government related functional departments, firms and investors.

自2008年证监会明确对财务顾问“明责、尽责、问责”的要求以来，上市公司的重大资产重组已由完全依靠证监会的行政监管逐渐转化为以独立财务顾问为主导的市场化监管。由此，独立财务顾问除了起着传统被认为的中介作用外，还被赋予了监督的职责。然而，对于独立财务顾问的这两种功能发挥效果，已有文献并没有给出相应的实证证据。本课题立足于中国特殊的制度背景，探讨了独立财务顾问机构和主办人两个层面的社会关系和专业能力对并购的影响；同时，将信息不对称（并购方和目标方之间）和代理冲突（并购方控股股东和中小股东之间）纳入研究框架，识别其发挥的中介作用和监督作用；进一步地，从并购效率（溢价率和业绩承诺）和并购绩效（市场绩效和财务绩效）两个方面，探讨了独立财务顾问产生的经济后果。本课题在丰富和发展公司并购和金融中介理论的同时，对委托代理和信息不对称理论也将有益补充；同时，对政府相关职能部门、公司及投资者都具有一定的启示

与西方国家不同，我国的独立财务顾问在并购重组中除了发挥了传统的中介作用之外，还被赋予监督的职能。本课题结合中国特殊的制度背景，探讨了独立财务顾问在并购重组中所发挥的作用，研究发现，高声誉的独立财务顾问更有可能对并购业绩承诺的制定和履行进行监督，从而对股票支付引发的并购双方“合谋”操纵业绩承诺行为发挥约束作用。该课题还发现, 高声誉的独立财务顾问有动机和能力引导公司披露更多有价值的并购重组的风险信息，提高了并购重组风险信息披露的信息含量，从而发挥监督和咨询的作用。同时，本课题发现当上市公司重大资产重组中聘用的独立财务顾问在过去的两年内受到过证监会的惩罚时，该上市公司的市场反应较差，即独立财务顾问的违规行为存在着股价传染效应，由此可知，目前我国的独立财务顾问的声誉机制是相对有效的，并且高声誉的独立财务顾问确实发挥了一定的监督作用。除此之外，本课题还结合我国的制度背景，围绕着并购重组的影响因素积极地进行探讨，发现多个大股东的股权结构能够降低公司的关联并购行为，降低溢价率，提高并购绩效；还发现《劳动合同法》实施之后，当目标方的劳动密集度比较高时，公司的并购绩效显著降低。同时，股权质押能促使公司进行更多有利于价值最大化的并购。本课题的研究在丰富和发展独立财务顾问所产生的经济后果以及公司并购的影响因素等相关领域的文献的同时，对于政府部门、公司和投资者更好地理解独立财务顾问在并购重组中的作用以及识别并购重组的影响因素具有重要的启示意义。