农地经营权抵押试点下金融机构决策行为及信贷合约设计优化研究

The land management right mortgage has archived good effect, partly to solve the problem of the lack of farmers' mortgage and borrowing, but by the constraints from legal, farmland management rights valuation, property rights trading platform and other factors, financial institutions will not be pleasure to loan, weakening the effectiveness of policy. This project based on the decision-making behavior of financial institutions from macro-prospect and micro-prospect, firstly is to analyze the stability strategy of financial institutions from the evolution process of the market participant, and to use MATLAB programming to carry on simulation verification. Secondly, we investigate on the financial institutions willingness and contract design preferences of farmland management right mortgage loans, and use the orderly Probit method to analyze the factors that affect the willingness of the financial institution to carry out the land right of mortgage management. Through the comparative study with the standard collateral loan contract, it clearly stipulates the key restriction on the land management right mortgage. Thirdly around the key elements of the constraints from the financial institutions and external institutions, we try to design the loan contract optimization program, and use experimental economics research method. We find the best way to carry out agricultural land contract management mortgage. In the end, we put forward targeted policy support and technical support program for agricultural land contract management mortgage.

农地经营权抵押贷款试点成效良好，部分解决了农户抵押缺失难题，缓解了借贷难题，但受法律约束、农地经营权估值难、产权流转难等因素制约，金融机构贷款意愿不高，农地经营权抵押功能虚置，削弱了政策效果。本项目首先从宏观和微观视角分析金融机构决策行为，宏观视角明确不同市场主体演化博弈过程中金融机构的稳定策略选择，运用MATLAB进行仿真验证，微观视角对金融机构开展农地经营权抵押贷款的意愿、合约设计偏好等进行实地调研，运用有序Probit方法分析影响金融机构开展农地经营权抵押贷款意愿的因素；其次通过与标准抵押物贷款合约进行对比，明确制约农地经营权抵押贷款开展的关键要素；然后围绕关键制约要素从金融机构内部和外部体制提出借贷合约设计优化的方案，运用实验经济学方法进行验证，明确不同市场条件下开展农地承包经营权抵押贷款的最佳实施环境；最后提出针对性的政策保障和技术支持方案。

农地经营权抵押贷款试点成效良好，部分解决了农户抵押缺失难题，缓解了借贷难题，但受法律约束、农地经营权估值难、产权流转难等因素制约，金融机构贷款意愿不高，农地经营权抵押功能虚置，削弱了政策效果。. 本项目首先从宏观和微观视角分析金融机构决策行为，宏观视角明确不同市场主体演化博弈过程中金融机构的稳定策略选择，运用MATLAB进行仿真验证，微观视角对金融机构开展农地经营权抵押贷款的意愿、合约设计偏好等进行实地调研，运用有序Probit方法分析影响金融机构开展农地经营权抵押贷款意愿的因素。发现农地经营权抵押开展与政府政策支持力度息息相关，在政府采取积极支持政策下，对借款人、金融机构和相关机构均进行统筹管理，可有效提升交易各方信任程度，农地经营权抵押贷款的交易费用最小，农地经营权可以发挥有效抵押物作用。反之，在政府消极支持政策下，只有在信用环境较好、产权明晰、农业经济占比较大的地区，金融机构可能会作出发放贷款的响应行为。微观上以客户经理为调查对象进行实地调研，发现客户经理最偏好的农地经营权抵押贷款人特征是良好的信用记录、能够提供其他形式的抵押品增信和丰厚的家庭财产。最看重的因素是农地是否确权、农地流转手续的完整性和申请人的经营能力。金融环境因素是相关法律的完善和相关政策的稳定、地区农户金融素养越高。. 然后围绕关键制约要素，结合当前农户被动违约因素较为明显，降低信用风险的关键是降低农户收入的不确定性，如意外、疾病等因素引起的家庭收入突然性锐减问题。认为金融机构信贷合约优化设计中风险补偿比例、抵押率、估值准确程度、处置成本要素关键在于政府支持、估值与信用问题，因此金融机构信贷合约的关键是筛选出信用良好客户和对农地经营权抵押贷款准确估值，并尝试运用实验经济学方法进行验证，明确不同市场条件下开展农地承包经营权抵押贷款的最佳实施环境；最后提出针对性的政策保障和技术支持方案。.