基于私募股权基金的公司治理机制研究

Agency problem is the core issue of corporate governance, which arise from the separation of ownership and management. Jensen(1989) considered the active investor can effectively allevate the agency problem and propose a new governance mode called LBO alliance. For nearly five years, our country's private equity fund had rapid increases in fund raising and investment. The project will be based on the existing research literature and management practice in China, in-depth study of China's private equity fund's a variety of governance mechanism, construct a theoretical model to analysis the various kinds of agency problems, such as moral hazard, bilateral moral hazard, moral hazard, adverse selection, free-rider, bilateral barganing, window-dressing. Using case study and empirical research methods, The project will analysis the private equity fund investment decision-making and the influence on the company activities. The project will be provide valuable suggestions on chinese capital market's system design and financial innovation.

公司治理理论的核心问题之一是所有权和经营权分离引起的代理问题 Jensen（1989）认为主动性投资者可以有效的缓解代理问题，并提出一种称为私募股权基金联盟的治理模式。近五年，我国的私募股权基金无论是在资金募集还是在投资方面都呈现快速增长的趋势。本项目将基于已有研究文献和我国管理实践，深入研究我国私募股权基金的各种治理机制，构建理论模型分析基于私募股权基金的治理模式下的多种代理问题，如道德风险、双边道德风险、多任务道德风险、逆向选择、搭便车、双边讨价还价、业绩粉饰等；采用案例和实证研究方法，分析私募股权基金的投资决策以及对公司经营活动的影响。本项目将对我国资本市场制度设计和产品创新提供有价值的政策建议。