我国对外承包工程企业对海外项目部管控决策研究

In practice, Chinese international contractors either excessively control their overseas project divisions (OPDs), which makes OPDs incapable of adjusting to the overseas environment in making decisions, or seldom control them, which makes OPDs confused in making decisions in an overseas environment. Even though some scholars have investigated how the parent company should control their subsidiaries, these studies mainly focus on only one aspect of the management control – the scope, the mechanism, or the intensity - without considering the match of these three aspects. Moreover, the results offered by these studies cannot be directly applied to the setting of the overseas projects in consideration of their specific features. In order to fill this theoretical gap, this project aims to investigate the international contractors’ optimal management control decisions over their OPDs by taking the perspectives of the management control need, the management control effectiveness, and the management control cost. Firstly, taking the perspective of the management control need, this project will build an activity set including the activities of the OPDs that should be controlled and a mechanism set including mechanisms that can be employed. Secondly, based on the management control effectiveness, this project will refine the above activity set and the mechanism set to find out which activities can be effectively controlled under each management control mechanism. Thirdly, considering management control cost, the project will investigate the international contractors’ optimal control scope and control intensity over their OPDs under each control mechanism to minimize the transaction cost. In this way, the project is able to eventually match the control scope and the control intensity with different control mechanisms for an international contractor. Practically, this project offers theoretical guides and decision support to the Chinese international contractors in controlling their OPDs.

我国对外承包工程企业在对海外项目部管控时常常面临“一放就乱、一管就死”的困境。尽管学者们对母子公司的管控决策已经进行了一些研究，但这些研究主要聚焦于管控范围、管控机制或管控强度的某一个维度，并没有考虑三者之间的匹配性规律，而且其研究结论也不适用于海外工程项目的特殊情境。因此，本课题基于“匹配”的思想，从管控需求、管控效果和管控成本三种视角来探究我国对外承包工程企业对其海外项目部的最优管控决策。首先从管控需求视角构建我国对外承包工程企业对海外项目部的初始管控范围集和潜在管控机制集；其次从管控效果视角明晰我国对外承包工程企业在每种管控机制下对海外项目部的有效管控范围；最后利用交易成本理论，从管控成本视角探究我国对外承包工程企业对海外项目部在每种管控机制下最优的管控范围和管控强度，从而实现管控机制、管控范围和管控强度的匹配。该研究成果将为我国对外承包工程企业有效地管控其海外项目部提供理论指导。

世界经济全球化的不断深入和“一带一路”倡议的深入推进给我国对外承包工程企业（简称“总部”）提供了较好的发展前景，但同时也带来了巨大挑战，其中一个主要挑战是企业总部在对海外项目部管控时常常面临着“一管就死、一放就乱”的困境。为了解决该困境，本课题依次从管控需求、管控效果和管控成本三种视角对总部的管控决策展开研究。首先，课题组从管控需求的视角识别了影响管控范围的影响因素，并着重识别了海外项目部的任务特征，分析了这些任务特征对关系风险和绩效风险的影响，构建了基于海外项目部任务特征的初始管控范围集；其次，课题组识别了总部对海外项目部的三种管控机制，即行为控制、结果控制、社会控制，并基于管控效果视角，研究了不同的任务特征和类型，应该匹配哪种管控机制，能够实现好的管控效果；同时，课题组还研究了企业总部不同管控机制有效性的边界条件，即识别了海外项目部所嵌入的环境特征，企业总部的自身特征以及海外项目部的自身特征；探究了不同的环境特征、总部自身特征以及海外项目部自身特征匹配哪种管控机制，能够降低关系风险和绩效风险，构建了主体—客体—环境与管控机制的匹配模型；最后，课题组从管控成本视角，研究了企业总部对海外项目部的最优的管控范围、管控机制和管控强度的匹配。课题组聚焦潜在的管控任务特征和任务类型，并关注任务所嵌入的项目规模和东道国国家风险等多种前因条件，研究这些前因条件的不同组合如何与管控机制和管控强度进行匹配，才能实现对海外项目部的最优管控。课题研究成果已经在一些海外项目中得到了应用，为我国对外承包工程企业有效地管控其海外项目部提供理论指导。