促进创新的激励机制设计：基于多维度关联性信息的视角

Innovation has become a more and more significant factor that drives today’s economy. The entities investing to innovate primarily have correlated multidimensional private information in decision-making process. Also innovation delivers externalities in the economy. These facts lead to a consideration of mechanism design with multidimensional correlated information, which not only is a scientific research question but also hinges on the important aspect of current social and economic development. ..This project aims to establish an approach of analyzing the equilibrium outcomes in real markets where agents have multidimensional private information from the perspective of mechanism design. We approach the classic implementation problem with interdependent valuations in a new way. Instead of exploring conditions on preferences, we introduce a multidimensional semi-exclusive information structure that can help implement efficient or inefficient social choice rule in generic environments. Having the multidimensional correlated information and augmenting the payoff type space and redefining the mechanism design environments, we expect to restore the implementation of efficiency that would not have been possible following the routine method of finding global or local sorting conditions. This research extends the designing idea of Cremer and McLean (1985,1988)’s utilization of correlation of payoff types. Our research is expected to entail robust implementation theory.

创新已经成为今天经济发展越来越重要的一个促进因素。而创新活动本身所涉及到的参与创新的主体具有多维度的关联性信息，加之创新本身具有很强的外部性。这样的经济活动正好可以抽象建模，与多维度关联性信息的机制设计框架相吻合，引出促进创新的机制设计科学问题，也是当前社会经济面临的重要现实问题。..本研究项目从机制设计的角度分析经济主体拥有多维度私有信息的实际市场中的均衡结果。对于经典的实施问题，我们采用了一种全新的方法来作理论分析。与寻找关于偏好条件的方法不同，我们引入了多维度广泛关联性的信息结构。在一般化的经济环境中，这个信息结构可以帮助实施有效的或非有效的社会选择规则。通过多维度广泛关联性信息，增广类型空间和重新定义机制设计的经济环境，我们期望重塑有效分配性质下的实施理论。这一项目扩展了Cremer-McLean（1985，1988）利用信息类型的关联性来设计的思想，且期望建立稳健实施性的理论。