非对称信息下新产品开发激励与监督机制设计

Fierce global competition and fast change of technology may lead to shorten product life cycle. The rapid and efficient new product development is the inevitable choice for the enterprise to success and gain competitive advantage. The manager of the enterprise needs to correctly understand the information asymmetry and effectively incentive the product development personnel and supervise their effort levels in new product development setting which is a multi-stage decentralized decision making system. This proposal mainly studies the design of incentive and monitoring mechanism for new product development under asymmetric information. First, by systematically analyzing behavior charateristics of the manager of the enterprise and the product development personnel, serial and parallel multi task-based incentive and monitoring models, horizontal and vertical cooperation-based incentive and monitoring game models and technology import-based dynamic incentive and monitoring models will be established, respectively. Then, by discussing the crisp equivalent models and transforming them into optimal control problems, we will obtain the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium will be discussed. This proposal is of great significance and importance to the advancement of new product development theory and applications.

激烈的全球化竞争和快变的技术导致产品生命周期越来越短, 快速高效的新产品开发成为企业致胜与获取竞争优势的必然选择. 新产品开发作为一个多阶段分散决策系统需要企业管理者正确地理解新产品开发运行中信息的非对称性以及有效地激励与监督新产品开发人员的积极性和努力程度. 本项目主要研究非对称信息下的新产品开发激励与监督机制设计问题,首先系统地分析企业管理者和开发人员的行为特征，在此基础上分别建立基于串行与并行多任务分配的激励与监督模型、基于横向与纵向合作开发的激励与监督博弈模型和基于技术引进的新产品开发动态激励与监督模型。其次, 通过模型分析给出确定性等价模型, 进而求解等价模型给出对应问题的完美贝叶斯均衡、分离均衡、混同均衡；并分析各种均衡存在的充要条件. 本项目不仅具有重要的学术意义和实用价值，而且具有广泛的应用前景.

激烈的全球化竞争和快变的技术导致产品生命周期越来越短, 快速高效的新产品开发成为企业致胜与获取竞争优势的必然选择. 新产品开发作为一个多阶段分散决策系统需要企业管理者正确地理解新产品开发运行中信息的非对称性以及有效地激励与监督新产品开发人员的积极性和努力程度. 本项目主要研究非对称信息下的新产品开发激励与监督机制设计问题,首先系统地分析企业管理者和开发人员的行为特征，在此基础上分别建立基于串行并行多任务分配的激励与监督模型、基于横向与纵向合作开发的激励与监督博弈模型和基于技术引进的新产品开发动态激励与监督模型。其次, 通过模型分析给出确定性等价模型, 进而求解等价模型给出对应问题的完美贝叶斯均衡、分离均衡、混同均衡；并分析各种均衡存在的充要条件. 本项目不仅具有重要的学术意义和实用价值，而且具有广泛的应用前景。